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This manuscript examines how the dynamic macroeconomic effects from shocks to taxes 
and inflation differ between the United States and Argentina. On the fiscal side, wages, 
private capital, and consumption tax cuts have long-run revenue growth effects (in both 
countries) that mitigate initial tax receipt losses. These growth effects, however, are 
larger in Argentina – a country where both the consumption tax rate and sensitivity to 
wage changes are higher. Specifically, Chapter 2 finds that growth from a U.S. capital tax 
cut pays for roughly 60% of the initial static loss, whereas the corresponding effect in 
Argentina is 80%. On the monetary side, multiple regimes are then considered with 
money in the utility function to determine optimal scenarios, holding tax revenues 
constant. Chapter 3 concludes that distortions from taxes on wages, private capital, and 
inflation outweigh the efficiency losses from a consumption tax, and as such, an economy 
whose government places more emphasis on consumption to generate tax receipts 
achieves higher utility. The tax frameworks introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 build from the 
neoclassical Ramsey growth models. Inflation’s role as a source of revenue via 
seigniorage in Chapter 3 is extended to the Argentin  fixed income market in Chapter 4. 
Using proprietary pricing data and a structural vector autoregression framework, Chapter 
4 finds that inflation as a predictor of the probability of default in Argentina is much 
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larger than the government claims it to be; despite non-investment-grade government 
bonds, Argentina’s fixed income market actually became more attractive during the U.S. 
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To what extent do tax cuts pay for themselves? Are the macroeconomic growth 
effects of tax changes significantly different in countries with heightened inflation, labor 
elasticity of supply, and consumption tax rates? Is it more optimal to favor one tax over 
another? Does inflation play a significant role when constructing tax policy and sovereign 
debt products in growing economies? The well-reasoned and correct answers to these 
questions are critical for the proper implementation of governmental fiscal and monetary 
policy – especially in emerging markets that rely heavily on global investors to drive 
growth.  Accordingly: Chapter 2, “Dynamic Scoring and the Consumption (Fair)Tax”; 
Chapter 3, “Tax Regime Optimality with Money in Utility”; and Chapter 4, “Argentine 
Debt Spreads: An Analysis with Global Risk Aversion and Inflation” present conceptual 
frameworks and statistical models designed to study, test, and answer the above inquiries. 
 Chapter 2 is an extension of the Ramsey neoclassical economic growth model by 
including consumption taxes in the government revenue function and estimating the 
dynamic scoring revenue effects of tax cuts. This framework is applied to the U.S. and 
Argentina – two countries where consumers are faced with differing consumption taxes 
and respond differently to changes in wages. While static scoring significantly 
overestimates initial revenue losses from tax cuts in he U.S. and Argentina, the long-run 
growth effects of labor income and consumption tax cuts are more than two times greater 
in Argentina. Moreover, the model is modified to simulate a tax regime that only derives 
revenue from consumption – also known as a FairTax system. If such a system were to be 
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implemented, the tax rate required to generate the same level of receipts (as a fraction of 
output) is estimated to be 33.4% for the U.S. and 48.9% for Argentina.  
  Chapter 3 introduces inflation into the model and demonstrates that, while a 
FairTax regime is politically unfavorable and an unlikely scenario (especially in countries 
such as Argentina which already have high consumption taxes), a consumption tax by 
itself yields the highest utility. Labor tax distorti ns derived from reduced production; 
deadweight losses of saving reductions and investment inefficiencies stemming from 
private capital taxes; and inflation tax efficiency losses such as currency devaluation, 
high administrative costs, and suboptimal cash good-cre it good decisions, outweigh the 
distortions from a consumption tax. Investment in capital stock, consumption, and output 
all drop proportionally more when labor, capital, and inflation taxes are the main sources 
of government revenue, thereby reducing utility (particularly when capital taxes are 
heightened). For example, under constant revenue levels, utility is 15.5% higher when 
capital, labor, consumption, and inflation taxes rates are 6.4%, 25.0%, 15.0%, and 3.0% 
as opposed to 25.0%, 25.0%, 5.0%, and 3.0%, respectively.  
The overly optimistic ‘official’ inflation rate in Argentina has long been criticized 
(and widely disregarded) by Argentines and economists alike. The Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Censos (or National Institute of Statistics and Census) claims inflation is 
roughly 9% year over year; however, consultancies calculate it to be closer to 26% 
annually. The staggering 1700 basis point difference is quite worrisome if policy 
decisions are based on faulty statistics, especially when there is uncertainty on how long 
an economy like Argentina can sustain such inflation. Institutional investors, both 
domestic and abroad, are well aware of the discrepancy nd must take the appropriate 
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risk precautions before purchasing fixed income and equity assets denominated in 
Argentine pesos. Chapter 4 therefore provides an extensive literature review of 
fundamental and external factors that affect Argentin  sovereign debt spreads while 
confirming in an SVAR model the negative relationship between Argentine sovereign 
spreads and interest rates, the positive relationshp of spreads and global risk aversion, 





Dynamic Scoring and the Consumption (Fair)Tax 
The extent to which tax cuts pay for themselves is a question of major importance 
to institutions such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT) when advising on fiscal policy. Traditional methods used by such 
consultancies estimate revenue changes (“the score”) f a tax proposal assuming certain 
macroeconomic aggregates such as the Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate, the 
rate of inflation, interest rates, and the unemployment rate are fixed (JCT, 2011). This 
long-standing method, traditionally called “static s oring,” of assuming a tax proposal 
does not change the total income growth rate – also ob erved by the CBO and the Office 
of Tax Analysis of the Department of Treasury – allows for easy comparison between the 
current “baseline” revenue estimates (with the same economic assumptions) and the 
anticipated receipts from a newly-proposed legislation. Baseline revenue estimates 
(provided to the JCT by the CBO every January) are 10-year projections of federal 
receipts and act as a starting point for the JCT when advising on new policy. 
The fixed macroeconomic assumptions also allow for modeling of 
microeconomic behavior without having to predict fuure monetary and fiscal policy. 
Static scoring is the JCT’s traditional name for “conventional revenue estimates,” and can 
be misleading since behavioral responses ar  factored into the projections, so long as the 
GNP growth rate remains unaffected. Some examples of behavioral responses include an 
investor’s decision to realize capital gains as a result of lower taxes, or a laborer taking 
more of their taxable wages and less compensation in the form of fringe benefits in the 
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current period prior to a future tax increase. The JCT’s static models are designed with 
collaboration between economists, tax lawyers, and ccountants, using algorithms and 
statistical packages with thousands of historical individual, corporate, estate, excise, and 
energy tax filings, to name a few.   
While static scoring estimates are necessary starting points, “dynamic scoring,” 
on the other hand, has become an important tool to predict revenue fluctuations, as it 
considers feedback effects via changes in the aforementioned aggregate macroeconomic 
variables (i.e., the output growth rate and labor supply). In addition to providing, most 
notably, congressional members with the score of a proposed tax change, the JCT also 
provides dynamic estimates (also known as “macroeconomic modeling”) using various 
models. In many cases, the macroeconomic effects are o small that a brief statement in 
the proposal request is sufficient. However, in more detailed cases the JCT can utilize one 
of their three in-house models. They include macroeconomic equilibrium growth 
(“MEG”) models, overlapping generations (“OLG”) models, or dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (“DSGE”) growth models with infi itely lived agents. Additionally, 
the JCT utilizes the econometric models of Macroeconomic Advisors and HIS Global 
Insight. 
 The dynamic scoring framework is ideally suited to calculate macroeconomic 
feedback effects from a tax cut by comparing steady state levels under a conventional 
static system with those of a dynamic system. For example, if the dynamic score of a tax 
cut is 40% of the static effect, then 60% of the tax cut pays for itself through heightened 
consumption and investment activities. Often times dynamic scoring indicates that tax 
cuts partially pay for themselves; however, in special ases (such as countries like 
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Argentina with high consumption tax rates and elasticity of labor supply) tax cuts can be 
self-financing in the steady state. 
This chapter follows the methods of Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) (hereinafter 
MW) whereby baseline, static, and dynamic estimates are determined within a 
neoclassical Ramsey growth model. The baseline estimates are determined from initial 
model conditions (without any tax shock). Static revenue estimates are found by keeping 
the output growth rate constant after a tax change and are proportional to the tax change 
itself. The dynamic estimates are then calculated after considering all macroeconomic 
effects from a tax cut – essentially comparing the initial steady state with the new steady 
state. 
 Additionally, this chapter is an enhancement to the dynamic scoring literature 
(MW; Leeper and Yang, 2008; Ferede, 2008; Stinespring, 2010; and Strulik and 
Trimborn, 2011) by adding a consumption tax to the government revenue function (the 
MW model only considers a capital and labor tax), eamining how the feedback effects 
differ when considering three taxes instead of solely taxes on labor and capital, and 
exploring the differences in macroeconomic growth between the United States (as a 
benchmark) and Argentina (a country with different labor supply responses to wage 
fluctuations and a high consumption tax rate). 
  The results of this augmentation demonstrate thatwhen accounting for a 
consumption tax, growth pays for 61% of the static revenue loss of a capital tax cut and 
20% of a labor tax cut. These growth effects are lager than the 53% and 17% found by 
MW. When the same methodology is applied to the Argentine economy, the growth 
effects are 82% and 48% – the respective differences being mainly attributable to the 
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significant feedback effects of extra after-tax wages and private capital. The growth 
effects from a consumption tax cut for the U.S. and Argentina are 10% and 24%, 
respectively.  
 Section 2.3 derives Laffer curves for each tax rate. The revenue-maximizing 
capital and labor tax rates are 44.3% and 70.2%, and 34.9% for the U.S. and 49.6% for 
Argentina, respectively. Visual aids are then used to show the sensitivity of the Laffer 
curves to the elasticities of labor and capital. An additional consideration to the dynamic 
scoring outcomes is the time period in which each effect takes place. For example, the 
efficacy of tax policy advocating for lower taxes might be called into question if the 
steady state growth effects do not materialize until many years after the tax cut. The 
reduction in revenue following a labor tax cut is like y the result of the substitution effect 
being larger than the income effect as consumers decide to increase their leisure time 
after an increase in after-tax wages. However in the longer term, consumer behavior 
changes and hours worked increases significantly. Section 2.4 therefore examines the 
transitional dynamics of tax cuts, and finds that te immediate impact of a capital, labor, 
and consumption tax cut in the U.S. is 4.3%, 13.4%, and 7.0%, respectively.  
 Section 2.5 modifies the dynamic scoring framework to simulate a “FairTax” 
system whereby the government only collects receipts from a single, flat-rate 
consumption tax. While the probability of the U.S. or Argentina switching to a FairTax 
system is low, the appropriate tax rate that would be required for each country to replace 
their current systems is the subject of considerabl debate. Tuerck et al (2007) suggest 
that a tax-exclusive rate of 30% (or a 23% tax-inclusive rate) would be sufficient to 
8 
 
generate similar revenue levels as under the conventional U.S. tax structure.1 Similarly, 
Section 2.5 finds that a tax-exclusive consumption rate of 33.4% (or a tax-inclusive rate 
of 25.0%) would generate the same revenue in the conventional tax system.2  In 
Argentina, the value is 48.9% (or a tax-inclusive rate of 32.8%).3 Dynamic scoring of the 
FairTax model finds that a consumption tax cut pays for 8.3% of the static effect in the 
long run in the U.S. and 19.7% in Argentina. 
 
2.1 Model 
In this section, the Ramsey growth model is augmented to include a tax-collection 
scheme based on private capital, labor, and consumption. The model assumes an 
infinitely-lived representative household that chooses consumption, C, private capital, K, 
and hours worked, N, to maximize expected utility; profit-maximizing firms; labor supply 
that is elastic; and a government that balances its budget via government transfers, .  
2.1.1 Production Function 
The production function has constant returns to scale in competitive input and 
output markets. The function, suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), in per 
efficiency unit terms is4  
    , 	
  	.      (1) 
                                                
1This rate is suggested in H.R. 25, Fair Tax Act of 2007. 
2The tax-inclusive rate means that a tax on a good priced at $86.4 would be $13.6 (or 13.6%), bringing the total price to $100. The 
tax-exclusive rate would be 15.7% (or 13.6/86.4), or equal to [tax inclusive rate/(1-tax-inclusive rate)]. 
3Throughout this paper, t will denote the tax-exclusive consumption rate. 
4Each variable is adjusted to per efficiency unit (or per effective worker), which is calculated by divi ng by AN..A represents labor-
augmenting technology with a growth rate equal to g. In other words, A  Ae. 
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The production function is twice continuously differentiable on the set of positive real 
numbers,  , and satisfies the Inada conditions:   ∞ as i approaches zero and   0 
as i approaches infinity, where    and 	.  
Per capita output, , is produced by households in the form of per-efficiency unit 
labor, 	, and private capital, . Profit-maximizing firms produce until their input costs 
equal their corresponding marginal products, which are given as:    
     , 	
  !	,      (2) 
 "  #, 	
  1 % !
	.     (3) 
The variable r is the before-tax rate of return on capital and w is the wage rate. 
2.1.2 Government 
This paper assumes tax revenues collected by the gov rnment come from return 
on private capital, , and wages, "	, as in MW. However, a tax, &', on per-effective 
consumption, (, is added to the revenue function.5 As in MW, the government maintains 
a balanced budget by spending tax receipts,  , on government transfers,  . 6  The 
government budget constraint can therefore be defined i  per-effective worker terms as: 
      &#"	 ) & *++++++,++++++-./ .0123 ) &'(,      (4a) 
where &# and &  are taxes on labor and private capital, respectively. Government transfers 
can take the form of activities such as welfare, farm subsidies, social security, and 
unemployment benefits.  
                                                
5Per-capita, per-effective, and per-efficiency are us d synonymously throughout the paper. 




The representative household is assumed to be infinitely-lived and derives utility 
from consumption and disutility from working. The utility function takes the form 
proposed by King et al (1988) whereby preferences are characterized by consumption 
and labor. The household’s utility function is given as:  
  4  5 6789 '2:;
<=>2<=>
?@
A B&,     (5) 
where C  is the curvature parameter, D  is the discount rate of the consumer’s time 
preferences,   is the rate of labor-augmenting technological change, and E	
  is a 
differentiable function of labor supply.  
The supply function, E	
, is defined in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) as:  
  E	
  F	<GHH ,        (6) 
where F is a scalar set equal to 3, as is the case in busiess cycle literature – labor time is 
restricted to about 1/3 of the total time available. The constant I (greater than zero) is the 
constant-consumption elasticity of labor.7  
 The elasticity of labor supply, or the responsiveness of labor supply to wage 
changes, has an important role in determining the impact of the feedback effect. The 
empirical value of I varies widely in the literature. For example Fuchs, Krueger, and 
Poterba (1998) found in a survey that the median labor economist believes the value is 
0.18 for men and 0.43 for women. Kimball and Shapiro (2003) find that the Frisch 
(constant marginal utility) and constant-consumption elasticities are near one and roughly 
1.25, respectively. Peterman (2012) finds that microe onomists estimate the Frisch labor 
                                                
7The results do not change when F fluctuates. For example, when F  J, the dynamic feedback effect (explained later) for a change in 
the labor tax decreases by 3L10. The same is true for values higher than one and for changes in the other taxes. 
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supply elasticity to be between zero and one half, while macroeconomists tend to use 
values between two and four when calibrating their general equilibrium models.  
Reynaga and Rendon (2012) assert the Peruvian Frisch elasticity to be 0.38, while 
González and Sala (2011) find Brazilian, Uruguayan, Paraguayan, and Argentine values 
to be -1.9, -1.4, -13.1, and 12.8, respectively. The 12.8 for Argentina is highly unlikely 
and too far from consensus estimates that an average instead will be used for the 
calibration in the next section. Shimer (2010) uses four different values of elasticities in 
his calculation of measuring the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution of 
consumption for leisure and the marginal product of labor (i.e. the labor wedge); he 
considers I equal to 0.5, 1, 4, and ∞ (perfectly elastic). Buffie et al (2012) and Prescott 
(2004) assert that an elasticity of 3 is appropriate for international developing economies 
abroad. Reichling and Whalen (2012) purport that macro estimate range from 2 to 4. 
Finally, Ribeiro (2001) calculates 0.01 to be approriate for Brazil. 
When I  is equal to zero, the labor supply curve is perfectly inelastic, which 
implies hours worked are insensitive to fluctuations i  wages. This chapter uses MW’s 
constant-consumption value of 0.5 when calibrating o the U.S. economy and 1.5, which 
is based on an average of international and Latin American estimates, for the calibration 
of Argentina. Given the amount of lower-skilled demand and labor force in Argentina, 
we would naturally expect the labor supply to be more elastic than the United States’ 
elasticity. It should be noted that there is a difference (though slight, according to 
Kimball and Shapiro) between the Frisch and constant-co sumption elasticities. For 
reference, Bilbiie, 2009 and Kimball and Shapiro both utline that the Frisch value is 
always below the constant-consumption elasticity.  
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In order to pay for consumption, consumption taxes, and investment in private 
capital,  , households are faced with a budget constraint consistent with fiscal structure. 
Household disposable income is derived from after-tax wages, 1 % &#
"	 , after-tax 
return on private capital, 1 % & 
, and government transfers:   
 1 % & 
 ) 1 % &#
"	 )   1 ) &'
( )  .   (7) 
Investment in capital,  , is equal to the change in capital, M , plus existing capital 
adjusted for the growth rate, . This relationship is described as: 
    M ) .        (8) 
The household’s dynamic budget constraint in per-effective worker terms is total wages, 
returns from private capital, and government transfers less consumption and private 
capital adjusted for technological change. In other wo ds, combining Equations (7) and 
(8) gives the household budget constraint:  
  M  1 % &#
"	 ) 1 % & 
 )  % 1 ) &'
( % ,  (9a) 
where NO89678  0.        
The steady state equilibrium is determined by the above conditions, as will be 
shown in the next subsection.  
2.1.4 Steady State 
Given the above utility preferences in Equation (5)subject to the budget 
constraint in Equation (9a), household maximization of a PQOR&S	Q	 framework with 




' ,       (10) 
                                                
8 For derivations of the Hamiltonian first-order conditions, see Appendix A. 
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'  WW F	<H,       (11a) 
and 
  
'M'  A X1 % &
 ) 1 % C
ET	
	M % D ) C
Y.   (12) 
In the steady state all the “dot” variables become zero, which reduces the 
intertemporal first-order condition to 
    7ZA8[ .        (13a) 
Moreover, the budget constraint in Equation (9a) becomes zero in the steady state making 
consumption equal to9 
  (   % .        (14) 
The steady-state values of the endogenous variables, k, n, r, w, and c are full determined 
by Equations (1), (2), (3), (11), (13a), and (14). 
The above system of simultaneous equations can be solv d with a mathematical 
software package such as \Q]R6 . Steady state labor, 	^^ , private capital, ^^ , and 
consumption, (^^, are as follows: 








H<GH,    (15)  
 ^^  	^^ _8[
7AZ a
<<=b,      (16) 
 (^^  	^^ cd8[
7AZ e
b<=b %  d8[
7AZ e
<<=bf.    (17) 
                                                
9 Note that through simplification wn + rk = y. 
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The above steady-state variables can then be used to determine revenue in the steady 
state. The steady-state revenue function is necessary to derive the dynamic scoring 
feedback effects. 
 
2.2 Dynamic Scoring 
Unlike dynamic scoring, static scoring does not account for macroeconomic 
feedback effects such as changes in consumption, labor supply, investment and saving 
following a tax cut. The static effect of a capital, l bor, and consumption tax cut is the 
derivative of Equation (4a) with respect to & , &#, and &', respectively:  
  
1gh8[ |^8j8'    !,       (18) 
  
1g18@ |^8j8'  "	  1 % !
,      (19) 
  
1g18V |^8j8'  (.        (20) 
The static effect of a tax cut therefore leads to aproportional decrease in tax revenues by 
its respective tax base. As is the case at the JCT,the output growth rate stays constant 
following a tax cut. Conveniently, we are able to write the static effects of capital and 
labor in terms of output, y. This paper asserts that in the static effect for consumption, the 
consumption tax base will stay constant. As such, the static score will be proportional to 
the tax base, as in the other two taxes. 
Dynamic scoring, on the other hand, allows the endogen us variables to fluctuate 
following a tax change. Rather than taking the derivative of Equation (4a), as was the 
case for static scoring above, we will consider the new steady-state revenue function 
15 
 
 ^^  &#"^^	^^ ) & ^^^^ ) &'(^^      
or 
 ^^  &#1 % !
^^
	^^
 ) & !^^
	^^
 ) &'(^^ (21) 
where the steady-state values for private capital, labor, and consumption are described by 
Equations (15)-(17) derived above. The dynamic effects are calculated by taking the 
derivative of ^^ with respect to each tax.10 The static effect is then pulled out of the 




 |1l#jm'  Xn66BoQ( p6(&Y q 1g18jk
 |^8j8' .   
The 66BoQ( 66(& represents the percentage of the estimated static revenue 
decrease that is actually lost. In other words, if the feedback effect is 40%, then 60% of 
the estimated static revenue loss after a tax cut is mitigated via macroeconomic feedback 
effects such as increased labor supply, investment in capital, saving, and consumption. If 
the feedback is negative, then not only is the static revenue loss following a tax cut 
completely financed (or recovered), but macroeconomic feedback effects actually 
generate larger tax receipts than under the initial tax rate. Some economists would 
therefore argue that the economy exhibited tax rates that started on the right side of the 
Laffer curve apex. If the feedback effect is greater than one, however, then the initial 
static estimate r	B66s&OQ&6s the revenue loss of a tax cut.  
Given Equation (21), the actual dynamic scoring estimates following a capital, 
labor, and consumption tax, respectively, are given as 
                                                
10 Since parameter values are plugged into this equation, the only variable left is the corresponding tax rate. If this is done by hand 
(without entering parameter values), then the totalderivative must be derived. 
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f q 1g18V |^8j8' ,  
where A(8[
u 
 b<=b and   D ) C. The feedback effects have three terms, each of 
which are the capital-, labor-, and consumption-feedback effect from a tax cut. For 
example, the first term in Equation (24) is the capital-feedback effect from a consumption 
tax cut, while the second and third terms are labor- and consumption-feedback effects 
from a consumption tax cut, respectively.11 Numerical feedbacks are calculated by 
plugging in plausible parameter values suggested by MW and others, as seen in Table 5 
of Appendix C. There is widespread debate about setting the appropriate rate for the U.S. 
                                                
11Each term in Equations (22)-(24) is positive, which means the plus or minus sign in front of each term indicates whether the 
feedback effect is increased or decreased, respectively.  
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consumption tax. Suggested rates range from 5%, Trabandt and Uhlig (2009), to 28%, 
Diamond and Zodrow (2008), depending on the tax colle tion structure. Given the tax 
framework in this paper, &'  0.05. The VAT rate in Argentina is 0.21, which is what 
this paper assumes as well. 
MW find, for example, 1g18[ |1l#jm'  0.47 q 1g18[ |^8j8' and 1g18@ |1l#jm'  0.83 q 1g18@ |^8j8', 
which means growth pays for 53% of the static revenue loss from a capital tax cut and 
17% from a labor tax cut. The dynamic feedback effects for the U.S. in this chapter are as 
follows: 
    
 
1g18[ |1l#jm'  0.389 q 1g18[ |^8j8' , 
  
1g18@ |1l#jm'  0.803 q 1g18@ |^8j8' , 
  
1g18V |1l#jm'  0.897 q 1g18V |^8j8'. 
Growth pays for 61.1%, 19.7%, and 10.3% of a capital, labor, and consumption tax cut, 
respectively. The increased growth effects of the capital and labor tax cuts compared to 
the MW results are due to the additional avenue of tax collection added in this model – 
namely, consumption. In other words, tax receipt losses resulting from labor and capital 
tax cuts are now buffered by the addition of consumption tax revenue. As a result, tax 
receipts are not as dependent on labor and private capital in this model as they were in the 
MW model, which explains the higher growth effects. Additionally, the feedback effects 





U.S. and Argentine Feedback Effects and Implied Growth 
 
  Feedback Effects 
Tax US AR 
tk 0.389 0.180 
tn 0.803 0.524 
tc 0.897 0.763 
 
As outlined earlier, this chapter assumes that all tax receipts are spent on 
government transfers. However, as would be expected, th  feedback effects change as the 
government alters its allocation of receipts. For example, Ferede (2008) extends the MW 
paper by examining how the capital and labor feedback effects change when the 
government allocates tax receipts to 1) government tra sfers (as in this paper and MW), 
2) government consumption, or 3) productive services.12 Table 2 below summarizes the 
results of Ferede, MW, and this paper. The results for each author have very similar labor 










                                                
12 Both MW and Ferede do not use a consumption tax in their model. 
Implied Growth Effects 
Tax US AR 
tk 61.1% 82.0% 
tn 19.7% 47.6% 
tc 10.3% 23.7% 
 
MW, Bauser, and Ferede Feedback Effects
 
  Capital Tax Cut 
Author  Transfer Consumption 
 MW  0.47  
 Bauser-US  0.39   
 Bauser-AR 0.18  
 Ferede  0.53  
 
 
The feedback effects have some variability based on parameter values. As such, the 
sensitivity of the feedback effects to the elasticity of capital, 
in Figures 1 and 2 below, respectively.
 




  Labor Tax Cut 
 Spending  Transfer Consumption 
 0.83   
 0.80   
 0.52   
0.59  0.94  0.85  0.96 










1.53   

















   
 



























 Sensitivity of Argentine Feedback Effects to the Elasticity of Labor Supply
 
From the figures above, capital feedback effects are sensitive to the elasticity of capital, 
while the labor tax feedback effect is 








   
 
 





2.3 Laffer Curves 
Graphing the steady-state revenue function, ^^ with respect to the corresponding 
tax rate, while holding everything else constant, yields the following Laffer Curves below 
for a capital, labor, and consumption tax, respectiv ly. The revenue-maximizing capital 
tax rates for the U.S. and Argentina are 44.3% and 34.9%, respectively. The 
corresponding labor tax rates are 70.2% and 49.6% for the U.S. and Argentina. The 























































































(Sensitivity to the Elasticity of Labor Supply)
 
 
The results above for each tax rate assume the other two are held constant. While 
this assumption is required to derive the Laffer cuves, it is unlikely that one tax rate 
would be cut (or hiked) drastically without others changing as well. The analysis above
could therefore be extende  by examining how the Laffer c
rates vary as well. The flat (asymptotic) consumption tax curve above is similar to results 
found in Trabandt (2009). 
does not exist, and that income effect usually dominates the substit tion effect. He does 
find, in one case, that when the 
27 
Figure 8 




urves change as the other tax 
He shows that most of the time a consumption tax Laffer curve 
isoelastic curvature for consumption
 
 
 parameter in the 
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utility function is less than one (or   1), the substitution effect outweighs the income 
effect and a consumption tax Laffer curve exists. His model uses discrete time with a 
slightly different utility function than the one presented in this chapter. 
The new dynamic public finance (NDPF) literature has some clear differences 
with the traditional Ramsey growth results. In particular, the NDPF model exploits skill 
sets of individuals by incentivizing them via social security. Since skills are private 
information, people have an incentive to report the truth and strive to produce more, as 
they will be eligible for larger transfers after reti ment. Also, taxes on assets are 
determined by future labor income, and unlike the Ramsey model, capital tax rates of 
zero are suboptimal. The suboptimal finding stems from the need of a positive asset tax 
on current assets (or positive distortion on savings) so as to offset a reduced labor tax on 
current income (Golosov et al, 2007). In this example, the reduced income tax in the 
current period is the result of increased taxes on future labor, as it is more risky (a type of 
insurance against uncertainty). In other words, labor is taxed more in the future, which 
allows for lower taxes in the current period; in order to dissuade savings into the future, a 
positive capital tax is required (Grochulski and Kocherlakota, 2007). 
As in NDPF work by Kocherlakota, recent work by Diamond and Saez (2011) 
find that taxing capital is optimal. They similarly find that there is positive utility in 
discouraging savings so as to promote labor supply when future wages are uncertain. 
Diamond et al (2011) also argue that taxes should be higher for top income earners (even 
more so than currently in the U.S.). The rational for this is that tax rates for low earners 
could be reduced as a result. Moreover, they purport the elasticity of labor supply for top 
earners is lower than what our current tax rates would justify. In other words, increased 
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taxes on the wealthy would not adversely affect labor supply or utility. 
The overlapping generation (OLG) model differs from the Ramsey model in that 
horizons are finite, and agents overlap with another agent for at least one period. There 
are no bequests. The results of the traditional Ramsey growth model have several 
differences with the OLG model. It should be noted hat in both models an increase in 
capital taxes reduces capital formation and reduces savings. A labor tax also reduces 
capital formation when labor supply is elastic. In the overlapping generations model (as 
opposed to the infinite horizon case), a portion of the consumption tax burden is shifted 
from labor to capital. In the infinitely-lived setting, consumption taxes minimally affect 
capital. An important difference in the two models is the generational turnover effect, 
which is the passing away of older, wealthier generations and replaced by new generation 
with zero wealth. Older generations that consume out of accumulated financial wealth are 
therefore hit harder by a consumption tax (Heijdra et l, 2000). As such, a consumption 
tax can become more burdensome when the wealthy generations, with a majority of the 
accumulated capital, bear most of the brunt of the tax. 
This chapter, as in MW, assumes infinite horizons – assuming that generations are 
connected through altruistic bequests. To test the robustness, MW also extend their 
results to consider finite horizons. The results do not change when the model considers 
when a fraction of households consume their current income. This however only 
considers a government that collects taxes from labor nd capital. MW also consider the 
framework proposed by Blanchard (1985) whereby households have the probability of 
dying off each period. If a household dies, it is replaced by another. Households therefore 
annuitize their wealth and bequests do not exist. If the probability of death each period is 
30 
 
zero the model is equivalent to an infinite horizons setup. MW find that if the probability 
of death is 0.02, correlating to a time horizon of fifty years, the capital tax growth effect 
falls from 50 to 45%. If the probability falls to 0.05 (or a life span of twenty years), the 
growth effect falls to 39%. While the results do change with assumptions regarding 
horizons, the changes are not extensive. These examples assume inelastic labor supply. 
Heijdra et al find that in the elastic case, a consumption tax hs more of a negative effect 
on the older, wealthier generations, and allows capital stock in the long run to grow more 
via younger generation investment.  
 
2.4 Transitional Dynamics 
While the steady state feedback effects are an important indication of post-tax-cut 
behavior, they do not explain the whole story. If, for example, it takes twenty-five years 
for a tax cut to generate supply-side macroeconomic growth, then the efficacy of such a 
proposal will be called into question. It is essential to know at what point in time after a 
fiscal shock various factors come into play. Therefor , in this section the transitional time 
path of the revenue function after a tax cut will be mapped out following methods 
introduced in MW. 
The transitional dynamics are derived from a system of log-linearized differential 
equations. We can derive the time path of tax revenues by finding the paths of the 
endogenous variables , 	, and (. Once we have found these time paths, we can insert 
them into the revenue function to see how revenue lev ls evolve over time. To calculate 
the paths, we need values of each variable at threepoints in time: before the tax cut (0), 
immediately after the tax cut (), and in the steady state after the tax cut (ss). We will call 
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these variables , , ^^, 	, 	, 	^^, (, (, and (^^. We can solve for the initial and 
steady-state values by simply using the steady state equations derived above. We also 
know that the capital stock is temporarily fixed after a tax cut, meaning   . We 
therefore must derive 	 and (.  
First-order household maximization of consumption ad labor generate the 
following system of equations that represent economy dynamics. 
  
'M'  !1 % &
	 % D ) 
,     (25) 
  
#M#  8[ b=<#<=b
V[7Z
<H ,     (26) 
  
 M  	 % ' % .      (27) 
These equations assume the utility function is logarithmic C  1),13 which converts the 
original law of motion equation for consumption (12) to Equation (25).14  
These new dot equations are necessary because they can be easily linearized 
around the steady state:15 
  
1 18  !1 % &
6
   #
 % D ) 
,   (28) 
 
1 #18  <H !& 6
   #
 % !6 '  
 ) D ) 1 % !
, (29) 
 
1  18  6
   #
 % 6 '  
 % .    (30) 
Equations (28)-(30) are then combined to solve for the steady state (ss).16  
  6
   #
  7Z8 
, 
                                                
13MW assume the growth rate, g, is equal to zero 
14The derivation of Equations (26) and (27) can be seen in Appendix B. 
15Equations (28)-(30) are the same as (25)-(27) except the natural log is taken of the latter three, rarranged, and then exponentiated. 
16Equations (28)-(30) are all set equal to zero, since n the long run the variables do not change with respect to time. 
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These two equations are then inserted back into Equations (28)-(30) and differentiated 
with respect to each logged variable. The first-order approximation around the steady 
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ln   
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
,  (31) 
where   1 % !1 % & 

 . The mathematical software \Q&RQo  can be used to 
calculate the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix of parameters above. Assuming 
we call the three eigenvalues , , and , as well as the matrix of eigenvectors , we can 
define the paths of (8, 	8, and 8 by  
  ln (8  ln (^^ ) E68o ) E68o ) EJ68oJ, 
  ln 	8  ln 	^^ ) E68o ) E68o ) EJ68oJ, 
  ln 8  ln ^^ ) EJ68o ) EJ68o ) EJJ68oJ. 
Boundary conditions determine o , o , and oJ . Moreover, using parameter values 
specified in Table 5, we find that   0,   0 and   0.17 This implies that o  0 
and oJ  0 because otherwise RO89(8   (^^. We therefore have18 
  ln (8  ln (^^ ) E68o, 
  ln 	8  ln 	^^ ) E68o,  
  ln 8  ln ^^ ) EJ68o. 
                                                
17¡  0.182, ω  %0.0994, θ  0. 
18v  %0.486,  v  0.0839, vJ  %0.869. 
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As previously mentioned, the capital stock stays temporarily fixed after a tax cut, 
meaning   : 
  o    §  
¨©ª    «  
¨©ª .     (32) 
Using (32) we can define the dynamic system as 
  ln (8  ln (^^ )   «  
¨©ª E68 ,     (33) 
  ln 	8  ln 	^^ )   «  
¨©ª E68 ,     (34) 
  ln 8  ln ^^ ) ln  % ln ^^
EJ68.    (35) 
Equations (33)-(35) give us the log-values of each variable from immediately after a tax 
change until the steady state. The eigenvalue  describes the rates at which the variables 
converge to the steady state. Finally, since the rev nue function is given as 
  8   &#"8	8 ) & 88 ) &'(8 
         X1 % !
&# ) !& Y8 ) &'(8 
      X1 % !
&# ) !& Y8	8 ) &'(8,     (36) 
we are able to trace the revenue function through time following a tax change. 
Table 3 below shows the percentage of the static loss mitigated by feedback 
effects following corresponding tax cuts for the United States and Table 4 shows the 
effects for Argentina. For a more visual representation, the following figures graph the 







Table 3  
U.S. Feedback Effects Along the Transition Path 
Percentage of static revenue loss mitigated by economic growth 
 
Time  Capital Tax Cut  Labor Tax Cut  Consumption Tax Cut 
Immediate Impact  4.3  13.4  7.0   
1 Year  9.6  14.1  7.3  
5 Years  26.5  15.9  8.2  
10 Years  40.0  17.4  9.0  
25 Years  56.3  19.1  9.9 
50 Years  60.6  19.6  10.2  
Steady-State Impact  61.1  19.7  10.3  
 
 
Table 4  
Argentine Feedback Effects Along the Transition Path 
Percentage of static revenue loss mitigated by economic growth 
 
Time  Capital Tax Cut  Labor Tax Cut  Consumption Tax Cut 
Immediate Impact  1.3  7.1  0.0   
1 Year  13.1  13.0  3.5  
5 Years  45.4 29.2  12.9  
10 Years  65.3  39.2  18.8  
25 Years  80.4  46.7  23.2  
50 Years  81.9  47.5  23.6  




Figure 9  
U.S. Feedback Effects Through Time  









Figure 10  
Argentine Feedback Effects Through Time   





Compared to the MW model, a capital tax cut results in a lower feedback initially 
but regains ground after the first year and evolves more quickly towards the steady state. 
The labor tax starts off higher and maintains this effect until the steady state. The small, 
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but not negligible, effect from a consumption tax cut mitigates 10.3% of the estimated 
static impact. The significant reduction in Argentine revenue following a labor tax cut is 
most likely the result of the income effect being smaller than the substitution effect – 
people decide to use the extra take-home income to r lax and work less. In the longer 
term, however, consumer consumers choose to work moe.  
 
2.5 “FairTax”  
This section proposes a tax system in which tax revenues are collected solely 
from a consumption tax – a proposal known by advocates s the “FairTax” system. There 
are numerous questions as to the feasibility and efficacy of such a tax system, many of 
which this chapter does not attempt to answer. However, the dynamic scoring framework 
introduced in previous sections caters nicely to answering two questions of interest 
regarding a FairTax system: What is a feasible consumption tax rate? and What are the 
macroeconomic implications following a consumption tax cut? In order to answer these 
two questions, it is necessary to augment the previous framework to model a FairTax.  
Relatively small changes are required to model the proposed framework. For 
example, the revenue function in Equation (4a) becomes 
    &'(,        (4b) 
and the consumer budget constraint of Equation (9a) converts to 
  M  "	 )  )  % 1 ) &'
( % .    (9b) 
The first-order conditions via the Hamiltonian framework yields:19 
                                                






which setting equal to the derivative of Equation (6) with respect to n becomes 
  
U8V
'  % WW F	<H ,       (11b)  
and 
  
'M'  A X ) 1 % C
ET	
	M % D ) C
Y. 
The intertemporal first-order condition shown in Equation (13a) becomes     
  D ) C.        (13b) 
The steady-state endogenous variables y, k, n, r, w and (  are therefore fully 
determined by Equations (1), (2), (3), (11b), (13b), and (14). The only equations that 
changed from before are (11b) and (13b). Steady-state labor, private capital, and 
consumption are as follows: 






  ^^  	^^ _ 7AZa
<<=b,  
 (^^  	^^ cd 7AZe
b<=b %  d 7AZe
<<=bf. 
Notice these steady-state variables are the same as their previous counterparts without 
1 % & 
 and 1 % &#
.  
2.5.1 Consumption Tax Rate 
The steady-state consumption function, (^^, and the new revenue function in the 
steady state, ^^  &'(^^ , allow us to answer the first question: What is a fe sible 
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consumption tax rate? One way to answer this is by determining the consumption tax 
rate, &', that generates the same ratio of revenues to output as the conventional tax system 
introduced in Section 2.1.  
The revenue function introduced above is of the form 
   &#"	 ) &  ) &'(.   
After solving the previous model and calculating numerical results, the consumption tax 
rate in the FairTax model can be calibrated to generate equal revenue to output levels. 
The consumption tax rate calculated is 33.4%. In other words, if the FairTax system were 
enacted in the U.S., a 33.4% tax-exclusive rate on consumption would be required for the 
government to collect the same amount of tax receipts as before the tax code change. It is 
not surprising that the corresponding required tax rate in Argentina (48.9%) is greater, 
given the much higher tax rate already present. 
2.5.2 Feedback Effect 
The macroeconomic growth factors of a consumption tax cut accounted for 10.3% 
of the static effect under the tax system introduce in previous sections – lower tax rates 
increase the labor, capital, and consumption tax bases. However, in this section, 
consumption is the only source of tax revenue growth following a tax cut. As a result, the 
numerical feedback effect is 91.7%, which means growth only mitigates 8.3% of the 
estimated static revenue loss. The corresponding equation is given as   
  
hg18V |1l#jm'  X W8V
W
8V
Y q 1g18V |^8j8' , 
which after inserting plausible parameter values becomes20 
                                                




hg18V |1l#jm'  0.917 1g18V |^8j8' . 
The growth effects in Argentina following a consumption tax cut are a bit higher, or 
19.7%. In general, a lowered consumption tax does not have as many channels for 
feedback effects as in the previous model where the gov rnment collected revenues from 
other sources. This implies that tax cuts are less effective at stimulating growth and that 
the static estimate is more accurate under this simplif ed tax regime. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Conventional methods used by the CBO and JCT to estimate revenue losses 
following a tax cut involved static scoring. However, such methods do not consider long-
run macroeconomic growth effects such as changes in the growth rates of output, labor 
supply, investment in private capital, saving, and consumption. Dynamic scoring, on the 
other hand, considers these feedbacks. In this chapter, the dynamic scoring framework 
introduced in Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) is modified to incorporate a consumption tax 
in the revenue function and applied to the U.S. and Argentina. Revenue losses resulting 
from a private capital, labor, and consumption tax cut are statically overestimated by 
61.1%, 19.7%, and 10.3% in the U.S. and 82.0%, 47.6%, and 23.7% in Argentina, 
respectively. The Laffer curve revenue-maximizing private capital and labor tax rates are 
44.3% and 70.2% in the U.S. and 34.9% and 49.6% in Argentina. The conventional tax 
regime is further modified to model a FairTax scheme whereby the government only 
collects tax receipts from a flat-rate consumption ax. Under this system, a tax-exclusive 
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consumption tax rate of 33.4% (or 48.9%) is required to generate the same amount of 
revenue as the conventional tax system in the U.S. (or Argentina). 
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A Steady-State “Dot” Equations 
The steady-state dot equations are essential in solving the system for its 
endogenous variables. Given the utility function, (5) subject to the budget constraint, (9), 
the Hamiltonian set up is given as   




 % 11 % C ) ¬X1 % &#
"	 ) 1 % &
 )  % 1 ) &'
( % Y. 
First, the derivative of (A1) with respect to the control variable, c, set equal to 







 % ¬1 ) &'
  0 
or 
  ¬  2=­;2:;
<=>2<=>
?@
'=>8V .      (A2) 








 ) ¬1 % &#
"  0 
or 





U .     (A3) 















' ,       (A5) 
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which is Equation (10). 
The third step is to find the per-effective-worker law of motion for consumption, 
(M/(. To find this we need to consider the (Ss&Q&6 variable, ¬, and the s&Q&6 variable, . 
The negative derivative of (A1) with respect to  is equal to ¬M or BP/B:   
 ¬M  1°1         (A6) 
or 
  ¬M  %¬1 % & 
 % 
.      (A7) 
In order to set this dot equation equal to another one we will first take the time 
derivative of (A2) to get  




















 .    (A8) 

























8V . (A9) 
Simplifying (A9) gives 
  
'M'  A X1 % & 
 ) 1 % C
ET	
	M % D ) C
Y,    




B Transitional Dynamics Derivations 
To derive the transitional time paths for capital and labor, it is necessary to 
rearrange the “dot" equations in a form that can be easily linearized around the steady 
state. We already know the law of motion for capital (Equation (25)) as   
  
'M'  !1 % &
	 % D ) 
,     (B1) 
so we therefore move on to the private capital functio . We start with the budget 
constraint from Equation (9): 
  M  1 % &#
"	 ) 1 % & 
 )  % 1 ) &'
( % .  (B2) 
It is then transformed accordingly:  
    M  1 % !
1 % &#
 ) !1 % & 
 )  % 1 ) &'
( %  
            1 % !
 % &#1 % !
 ) ! % & ! ) &'( ) &#"	 ) & " % 1 ) &'
( %  
   % ! % &#1 % !
 ) ! % & ! ) &'( ) &#"	 ) & " % ( % &'( %  
   % &#1 % !
 % & ! ) &#"	 ) & " % ( %  
   % &#1 % !
 % & ! ) &#1 % !
 ) & ! % ( %  
   % ( %  
  	 % ( % . 
Then by dividing by k gives 
  
 M  	 % ' % .      (B3) 
Equation (B3) is equivalent to Equation (27) in theTransitional Dynamics ection (2.3). 
The next derivation is of the law of motion for labor. The steady-state labor 




'  WW F	<H.       (B4) 
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The following step involves taking the natural logarithm of both sides: 
  ln _8@

 b#=b8V
' a  ln _WW F	<Ha, 
which, after expansion, equals 
ln 1 % &#
 ) ln 1 % !
 ) !ln  % !ln 	 % ln 1 ) &'
 % ln (  ln 1 ) I
 % ln I ) ln F ) W ln 	. (B5) 
Now we take the derivative of Equation (B5) with resp ct to time. 
 
118 Xln 1 % &#
 ) ln 1 % !
 ) !ln  % !ln 	 % ln 1 ) &'
 % ln (Y 
  118 _ln 1 ) I
 % ln I ) Rn F ) W ln 	a, 
which simplifies to 





Next we insert Equation (B1) in for 
'M' and Equation (B3) for  
M
 above to get 
  






This equation simplifies to 
  
#M#  8[ b=<#<=b
V[7Z
<H .      (B6) 
Equation (B6) is equal to Equation (26) in the Transitional Dynamics ection. We 
therefore have the three equations ((B1), (B3), and (B6)) that model the dynamics of the 
economy, which are used to derive the time paths.
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C Parameter Values 
Table 5  
Parameter Descriptions and Values 
 
Symbol  Description  U.S.   AR   
!  Output Elasticity of Private Capital  1/3   0.25  
1 % !  Output Elasticity of Labor  2/3   0.75   
I  Constant-Consumption Elasticity of Labor Supply  0.5   1.5   
  Growth Rate  0.026   0.027  
F  Scalar in Labor Supply Function  3   3   
D  Rate of Time Preference  0.05   0.05   
C  Elasticity Factor (Isoelastic Curvature for Consumption)  1   1   
&   Private Capital Tax Rate  0.25   0.25   
&#  Labor Tax Rate  0.25   0.25  
&'  Consumption Tax Rate (Tax-Exclusive Rate)  0.05   0.21  









Tax Regime Optimality with Money in Utility 
 
The goal of this chapter is to 1) build on the dynamic effects of a tax cut 
introduced in Chapter 2 while considering seigniorage s another channel of revenue, and 
to 2) examine optimality given tax allocations – for example, capital, labor, consumption, 
and inflation taxes of 6.4%, 25.0%, 15.0%, and 3.0%, respectively, lead to utility 15.5% 
higher yet equal tax revenues to a regime with rates of 25.0%, 25.0%, 5.0%, and 3.0%. 
This chapter augments the model introduced last chapter by including a money-in-utility 
function and examining the dynamic scoring effects and optimality in both the U.S. and 
Argentina – the differences in each country primarily being their elasticity of labor 
supply, consumption tax rate, and inflation. 
The results suggest that tax regimes that place a high importance of collecting tax 
receipts from private capital and seigniorage (or low weight on labor and consumption) 
generate lower levels of utility. As discussed below, the distortions resulting from taxes 
on capital are plentiful and taxing consumption generates the largest utility levels. 
Theoretically there is no upper bound on a consumption tax since households must 
consume; however, individuals will not work or build capital stock if taxes on labor and 




The model assumes an infinitely-lived representative household that chooses 
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consumption, C, hours worked, N, and the quantity of real balances held, M, to maximize 
expected utility; profit-maximizing firms; and a government that balances its budget via 
government transfers, gT. The basic Ramsey growth model is used to derive steady-state 
levels of endogenous variables, while considering a elastic labor supply and a tax-
collection scheme based on private capital, labor, consumption, and seigniorage. 
 
3.1.1 Production Function 
As in Chapter 2, the production function has constant returns to scale in 
competitive input and output markets. The production function and its corresponding 
marginal products are:  
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3.1.2 Government 
The government collects revenue from private capital, rk, wages, wn, 
consumption, c, and seigniorage. The government budget constraint is the same as in 
Chapter 2 but now includes seigniorage: 
    & )&#"	*++++++,++++++-./ .0123 ) &'( ) ¸6¹º
*++,++-u2Z#0·jZ2  ,    (4) 
where &#, &  and &' are taxes on labor, private capital, and consumption, respectively. The 
last term in Equation (4) is the Cagan (1956) form f seigniorage. Inflation, π, acts as a 
tax rate and is used to determine the amount of tax receipts stemming from seigniorage. 
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The exponent in the last term also includes the real interest rate, which is denoted as i. 
 
3.1.3 Households 
The King et al (1988) utility function with real money balances is as follows: 
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where γ is the curvature parameter, ρ is the discount rate of the consumer’s time 
preferences, g is the rate of labor-augmenting technological change, β is the real money 
balance elasticity of utility, v(n) is a differentiable function of labor supply, and m is real 
money balances.  
The supply function, v(n), is given as:  
E	
  F	<GHH ,         (6) 
where ξ is a constant greater than zero (set equal to one f r simplicity) and σ is the 
constant-consumption elasticity of labor. Households pay for consumption, c investment, 
ik, and accumulation of real balances, am, with after-tax wages, after-tax return on private 
capital, and government transfers, gT:  
1 ) &'
( )  ) Qm  1 % &#
"	 ) 1 % & 
 ) .   (7) 
Investment in capital, ik, is given as 
  M ) ,         (8) 
and accumulation of real balances, am is given as ¼M½ , plus existing balances adjusted for 
the growth rate, ¾: 
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In per unit terms this simplifies to: 
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Rearranging terms gives: 
M ) OM  1 % &#
"	 ) 1 % & 
 )  % 1 ) &'
( %  % ¸ ) ¾
O.  (13) 
The above law of motion includes two state variables, k and m (added together can be 
interpreted as per person assets, or wealth).21  The steady-state equations of the 
endogenous variables are derived using in a Hamiltonian framework. 
 
3.1.4 Steady State 
The utility preferences described in Equation (5) subject to the budget constraint 
in Equation (13) can be used to describe the household maximization problem: 
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With respect to c, n, and m, the following first-order conditions are as follows: 
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The steady-state values of the endogenous variables y, k, n, r, w, m, and c are fully 
determined by Equations (1), (2), (3), (15), (16), (17), and (18). Consistent with the 
literature, that the real money balance elasticity of utility, β, enters Equation (17), which 
contributes to the elasticity of money demand with the other parameters (¸, ¾, and &'). 
The above system of simultaneous equations is solved with the mathematical 
software program Maple to determine the steady state variables in parameter form. The 
steady-state revenue function is necessary to derive re enue and utility levels given 
specified inflation, taxes, and other exogenous parameters. 
 
3.2 Revenue Effects with Seigniorage 
Before examining the optimality of various tax struc ures, it will be useful to 
examine how government receipts change after cuts under varying levels of inflationary 
distortions. Now that the framework incorporates an additional channel of government 
revenue, namely seigniorage, it is possible to examine the macroeconomic growth effects 
from tax cuts via dynamic scoring. The feedback effects from a labor and capital tax cut 
in Argentina under official inflation levels are much lower than when actual inflation is 
considered. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the government r ports an inflation rate of 
roughly 9%, while the consultancies argue it is closer to 26%. Theoretically, the extra 
source of revenue from an inflation tax should lessen the requirements to collect for the 
other channels. Increasing inflation in most develop d countries increases seigniorage 
since they are located on the ‘correct’ side of the Laffer curve. As Bali and Thurston 
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(2000) show, it is not unheard of for Argentina to be on the downward portion of its 
seigniorage Laffer curve. As inflation rises, efficiency losses (e.g. reduced consumption 
and investment in private capital) become more prevalent.  
As can be seen below, the top two tables below (in Table 6) are the results of 
Chapter 2 while the bottom two are the results from this chapter when considering 3% 
inflation in the U.S. and 9% and 26% inflation in Argentina. After incorporating 
seigniorage into the model, the macroeconomic growth effects are larger from 
consumption, labor, and capital tax cuts. In fact, not only does growth increase as the 
result of tax cuts with inflation, but a capital tax is nearly self-financing (99%) in 
Argentina when inflation is 26%. 
 
Table 6  
U.S. and Argentine Feedback Effects and Implied Growth 
 
No Seigniorage 
Feedback Effects Implied Growth Effects 
Tax US AR Tax US AR 
tk 0.389 0.180 tk 61.1% 82.0% 
tn 0.803 0.524 tn 19.7% 47.6% 
tc 0.897 0.763 tc 10.3% 23.7% 
With Seigniorage 
Feedback Effects Implied Growth Effects 
Tax US (3%)  AR (9%) AR (26%) Tax US (3%) AR (9%) AR (26%) 
tk 0.375 0.213 0.011 tk 62.4% 78.7% 98.9% 
tn 0.808 0.602 0.528 tn 19.2% 39.8% 47.2% 
tc 0.887 0.693 0.675 tc 11.2% 30.7% 32.5% 
 
Using plausible parameter values, the sensitivity to the real money balance elasticity of 
utility, β, of each feedback effect is shown in Figure 11 below. The capital tax has the 
greatest impact (though minimal) when β fluctuates. 
 



















Using two as a benchmark for 
curve is given in Figure 12 above. The apex is equal to one over 
all other rates are held constant. 
deriving the Laffer curve above, 
drastically without others changing as well. An extension
examine how the curve change
 
3.3 Optimal Utility
In this section, household utility levels are calculated using 
variables derived above a
compared with varying tax collection scenarios holding revenue constant. Instead of 
setting the marginal cost of each tax equal to each other to ‘minimize distortions’ as in 
                                            
22 See Table 7 in Appendix E for parameter values.
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Figure 12 
Seigniorage Laffer Curve 
 
Ä (Hoffman et al, 1995), the seigniorage Laffer 
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While holding other taxes constant is necessary for 
it is unlikely that one tax rate would be cut (or hiked) 
 f this analysis could be to 
s as the other tax rates vary as well. 
 
nd plausible parameter values.22  Utility levels are then 
 





many of the articles outlined above, this chapter will examine (and rank) each tax base’s 
contribution to household utility. For example, plausible current parameter values for 
capital, labor, consumption tax, and inflation rates of 25.0%, 25.0%, 5.0%, and 3.0%, 
respectively, lead to corresponding revenue and utility levels. However, respective rates 
of 6.4%, 25.0%, 15.0%, and 3.0% lead to equal tax receipts, but utility 15.5% higher.  
Some believe that if distortionary sources of revenue are the only means to 
generate tax receipts, then collecting some amount from each source is the best way to 
minimize the overall efficiency losses. In other words, if a government wishes to generate 
a certain level of revenues while inducing the minium amount of deadweight loss from 
tax distortions, then it should set policy such that the marginal distortionary cost per 
dollar of receipts is the same for each tax. As such, Phelps (1973) suggests the optimal 
combination of taxes should incorporate positive seigniorage, and therefore the monetary 
policy rule that nominal interest rates be zero, proposed by Friedman (1969), is not 
optimal. Friedman concluded that in a perfect world – without distortions – inflation 
would be zero, or even negative (deflation). Once effici ncy losses are present, however, 
inflation levels above zero are optimal. 
 
Optimal Inflation Tax 
 In general, the goal of the social planner, or utilitar an, is to choose a tax structure 
that maximizes the welfare of the representative consumer. Ramsey (1927) first proposed 
that tax rates should be implemented solely on commdities and based on consumers’ 
elasticity of demand for each good – commodities that are inelastic are taxed more. If, 
however, the social planner is unrestricted to choose any tax system, the optimal outcome 
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is widely understood to be a lump-sum tax. As Mankiw et al (2009) outline, while this 
type of situation avoids distorting consumer choices, it also places a tax burden equally 
among the rich and poor – an unpopular situation frm a political standpoint. 
 Another theory is that capital income ought to have  zero tax rate. As Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971) explain, since capital equipment is an intermediate good used in the 
production of future goods, it should not be taxed. According to Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1976), capital taxes should be uniform; as a tax on capital is basically a tax on future 
consumption and not on current consumption, it is not a uniform tax and therefore 
suboptimal. While there can be benefits to capital taxation, such as preventing over 
accumulation, higher capital taxes, in general, lead to large intertemporal consumption 
distortions that discourage saving and create excessive deadweight losses due to the 
highly elastic nature of the supply of capital. 
 Governments most likely do not follow a policy that minimizes deadweight loss 
given revenue obligations. Mankiw (1987) finds a significant positive correlation 
between higher tax obligations and inflation rates in the U.S. from 1952 to 1985, 
implying that governments meet their increasing tax revenue requirements by targeting 
seigniorage. Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) find confli ti g results in other countries and 
argue that inflation and tax policies change over time and purport that the significant 
positive correlation Mankiw found is not enough to fully confirm his theory. Mankiw 
claims himself that his theory only explains one third of the total variation of changes in 
the nominal interest rate. Additionally, Walsh (2003) outlines the role of nominal interest 
rate setting by a monetary authority to achieve tax obligations and how it plays a much 
larger role in non-industrialized economies than in industrialized ones. He also illustrates 
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that if utility is separable in money balances and consumption that taxing money would 
be optimal. 
Compared to emerging countries with higher inflations such as various Latin 
American economies, seigniorage’s role as a major revenue contributor in the U.S. is 
somewhat small. Calvo and Leiderman (1992) therefore examine countries where the 
inflation tax has played a larger role and exhibit wider variations in government budget 
deficits, money creation, and inflation. While their results seem to indicate (from a 
statistically significant standpoint) that the Argentine, Brazilian, and Israeli governments 
maximize the welfare of the representative individual by equating the marginal social 
costs of raising revenue through direct taxation and seigniorage, some outlier data points 
exhibited inflation rates too high to satisfy optimality.  
Taxing the Informal Sector 
Another reason for high inflation in emerging countries might be explained by a 
typically large informal sector. That is to say, governments are motivated by tax-evading 
informal economies to promote inflation. Many developing countries have proportionally 
large informal sectors that remained untaxed from the formal standpoint and an inflation 
tax is an indirect way of taxing the underground economy via a uniform ‘consumption 
tax.’ After setting up a model and taking the approriate first order conditions, 
Koreshkova (2006) estimates the underground economy using the returns to scale in the 
informal sector, the ratio of productivity levels in the formal and informal economy, and 
income tax imposed to the formal sector. She finds that when a subset of goods (within 
an underground economy) evades taxes, it is optimal for  government to target a positive 
inflation rate, which is contrary to the Friedman rule of zero inflation being optimal. In 
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particular, she finds that 4% is the optimal inflation rate for the benchmark economy (the 
U.S.), which would lead to seigniorage accounting for 2% of total tax receipts. 
Economies with large informal sectors, 70% for example, should have high inflation (up 
to 80%) with seigniorage accounting for over half of the receipts.  
Koreshkova argues that by setting inflation high in economies with large informal 
sectors, the distortion from individuals evading labor taxes in the formal sector is reduced. 
In other words, inflation acts as a uniform tax across both the formal and informal sectors, 
which increases the tax base and allows a lower tax on formal labor, thereby reducing 
labor tax distortions. This reduces the incentive for individuals to substitute their human 
capital into the less efficient informal economy. The optimal inflation rates found by 
Koreshkova are much higher than those found in Nicolini (1998) and Cavalcanti and 
Villamil (2003). Nicolini, who, unlike Koreshkova, determines production technologies 
exogenously, finds that the welfare gain from taxing the informal sector with inflation is 
insignificant. Furthermore, he estimates that even though Peru’s informal economy 
represents about 40% of GNP, the optimal nominal interest rate is somewhere between 7 
and 19%. 
Nicolini breaks up goods into four categories: (1) credit-underground, (2) cash-
underground, (3) cash-official, and (4) credit-official goods. Cash-underground and cash-
official goods are both subject to an inflation tax, while cash-official and credit-official 
goods pay both an inflation tax and a consumption tax. Credit-underground goods avoid 
inflation and consumption taxes altogether. After first order conditions, Nicolini 
calculates the size for the underground sector, which is relative to official GNP and is 
based on exogenous values of the capital tax rate, nominal interest rate, government 
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expenditures, and constants calibrated to estimate the proportional size of all categorized 
goods. While Nicolini finds the optimal inflation rate for a country like Peru with a large 
informal sector to be small, he also finds optimal inflation rates for the U.S. ranging from 
2.5% to 14%. His results are therefore somewhat ambiguous and contradictory given 
optimal inflation rates for the U.S. and Peru are not much different. 
Not only do Cavalcanti and Villamil report that inflation in economies with 
informal sectors should be positive, but they provide an analysis of how the structural 
imperfections affect the welfare cost function. As mentioned above, the Friedman rule of 
zero nominal interest rates holds without imperfections in input, output, or financial 
markets; Chari and Kehoe (2002) confirm this with shopping-time, cash-in-advance 
constraint, and money in the utility function, but when markets are complete. Cavalcanti 
and Villamil therefore assume markets are exogenously incomplete and examine the 
results through changing levels of incompleteness.  
After first order conditions they calculate a function that relates the informal 
sector with that of the formal, which can be determined by a parameter that describes the 
‘importance of formal and informal labor in production,’ the tax rate on formal labor, and 
the elasticity of substitution between informal and formal labor. They find that while the 
optimal inflation rate approaches the Friedman rulefor countries like the U.S. with the 
informal sector accounting for less than 10% of the formal economy, the optimal inflation 
rate for countries with an informal sector of 55% is 16%. Moreover, in order for 
emerging countries to justify a lower inflation rate, they will need to improve the 




While the model in this chapter does not include a measure for the informal sector, 
it incorporates seigniorage into the government revenue function, which allows for 
examination of how utility levels improve or diminish as inflation changes. In order to 
examine how utility levels change, while holding revenue constant, the steady-state 
endogenous variables are used in the following equations: 
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As expected, all taxes (including the inflation tax) have a negative correlation with utility; 
however, tax regimes that place more weight on colle ting receipts from consumption 
generate the most optimal utility levels, especially t high revenue levels. Revenue levels 
are held constant in Figure 13 below and inflation is kept above zero (or at 1%) for 
modeling purposes. At benchmark revenue levels (leftmost bar in Figure 13), a 
consumption tax by itself (with 1% inflation) can produce the same levels yet only taxing 














The above figure shows that taxes on consumption derive the most utility, holding 
revenue constant, especially compared to the base case. In fact, 
times greater in this special case. A tax on labor generates the more utility than a tax on 
inflation and capital, but not consumption.
from sources other than consumption increases, the 
the second-best alternative to taxing consumption. This holds for varying levels of 
revenue.  
These results are consist
from taxes on capital income largely o
a base case whereby the government only collects revenu  from a labor and capital tax, 
they find that the combined distortions are 13.3% of GNP. If labor tax revenue is 
replaced by a consumption tax, the d
the labor income is replaced by seigniorage revenue, the distortions are reduced to 12.4%. 
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Figure 13 
Optimal Tax Allocations 
utility is more than 3.5 
 As the proportion of tax receipts collected 
utility level decreases. Taxing labor is 
en  with Cooley and Hansen, who find that the distortions 
utweigh the distortions from taxes on labor. Using 
istortions are slightly reduced to 12.1% of GNP. If 
 
 
Additionally, if the capital tax is replaced by a consumption or inflation tax the 
distortions are largely reduce
receipts are only collected from a labor tax, the distortions are reduced to 7.8% of GNP. 
In sum, economies that substitute inflation and 
exhibit much lower welfare costs. These results by Colley and Hansen suggest that 
capital taxes have the largest welfare losses followed by labor and inflation. Taxes from 
consumption have the least amount of deadweight loss on the economy. This chapter 
finds that consumption taxes yield the lowest distortions followed by labor, inflation, and 
capital taxes. 
Also, the rightmost bar in Figure 
other rates largely unchanged from the fourth bar from the right, but revenue stays the 
same and utility drops significantly. This can be explained by the very flat capital tax 
Laffer curve seen below in Figure 14,
 





d to 6.6% and 6.7%, respectively. And lastly if government 
capital taxes for taxes on 
13 doubles the capital tax while leaving the 








On the Argentine side, receipts are 31% higher under an economy with 26% 
inflation compared to one with 9% inflation. A consumption tax alone generates the most 
utility as in the U.S. economy, although the welfare gain of moving to a single 
consumption tax in Argentina is not as large given the already-elevated consumption tax 
rate of 21%.23  
Governments are able to fulfill their budget constraint by issuing currency or 
imposing taxes on labor, capital, or consumption – each method has its own efficiency 
loss. High rates of inflation can lead to contracting nefficiencies, while higher taxes can 
adversely affect saving, investment, and labor supply. The results above indicate some 
revenue channels distort utility differently. The following text outlines further rational 
behind each tax’s distortions. 
Labor: 
Households receive income from capital and labor, which can be held in cash or 
used to consume goods or purchase additional capital. In theory, a higher marginal labor 
tax rate leads to a decrease in the net return to work, which reduces total hours worked. 
The deadweight loss that ensues is equal to the value of the lost net output minus the 
value of extra leisure time to the individual. A hig er tax on labor income can also 
discourage investment in human capital and entrepren urial behavior. This chapter (as 
explained in Chapter 2) assumes the elasticity of labor supply is higher in Argentina than 
the United States – labor taxes in Argentina are more distortionary, and therefore workers 
are more likely to forego income for leisure when taxes are high.  
                                                
23 The consumption tax rates under a FairTax system in this chapter differ slightly from those found in 




Feldstein (2006) argues that the average elasticity of hours worked with respect to 
after-tax wages (of around one) is widely underestimated because it does not consider the 
amount of human capital per worker. The level of education, training, experience, effort, 
and occupation are all factors that make up labor supply – not solely hours worked. As 
such, when labor taxes increase, the net loss in output is higher than only considering 
hours worked. Additionally, Feldstein highlights the deadweight loss resulting from 
workers’ decision to change their compensation structu e after tax hikes. In addition to 
cash, workers receive fringe benefits such as healt insurance, ‘comped’ meals, gym 
memberships, etc. Theoretically, workers increase their consumption of fringe benefits 
until it is worth one minus the tax rate, or equal to what the worker would receive in 
after-tax cash. The deadweight loss incurred after  tax hike would be the (high) cost of 
producing the fringe benefit minus the utility derived by the worker. 
Besides depressing the labor output and compensating workers with benefits that 
are worth less than their cost to produce, Feldstein argues higher labor taxes also cause 
people to purchase larger quantities of deductible goods. Such examples include 
mortgages, property taxes, and other tax-preferred consumables. Buying an exorbitant 
amount of deductible assets, as with consuming fringe benefits, produce a deadweight 
loss proportional to the reduction in taxable labor income.  
Capital:  
Capital or investment income includes corporate earnings, dividends, interest, and 
individual capital gains. Per Feldstein, there are two focal distortions resulting from 
capital taxes: (1) a reduction in net returns to saving that causes retirement consumption 
to drop and (2) structural inefficiencies that adversely affect individual and corporate 
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decisions. First, future consumption is reduced because of depressed saving today. This 
can be illustrated by the concept of compound growth. For example, a 5% reduction in 
savings today would lead to more than a 5% reduction in saving in the future. In other 
words, a tax on saving today has a compound effect into the future. A reduction in the 
future value of capital investment is a disincentive for individuals to work more hours, 
acquire human capital, and generate wealth today. 
The second major distortion of capital taxes has to do in large part with how 
corporations and individuals operate in an economy. For example, whether or not to pay 
dividends, whether to open a subsidiary domestically or abroad, whether to finance 
operations with debt or equity, how to amortize assets, or whether to realize capital gains, 
to name a few, all must be considered by profit-maxi izing investors. One of the most 
widely accepted distortions arising from capital taxes is the so-called double taxation on 
dividends. Not only do corporations have to pay taxes on income that can be paid to 
shareholders in the form of dividends, but individuals must then pay an additional 
personal income tax on those realized profits. Instead of paying dividends, businesses 
might decide perhaps to invest in foreign assets, thereby avoiding high domestic tax rates 
and reducing domestic revenue.  
Companies have two options for financing their operations besides reinvestment 
of net income: debt or equity. Since interest payments on debt are tax-deductible, 
corporations can be tempted to favor debt over equity. Some argue that private companies 
might not be as biased since they are not obligated to please shareholders with improved 
gross margins. That said, when a firm favors debt over equity, it may choose to invest in 
less-risky/ low return investments and reduce long-run growth so as to meet interest 
66 
 
obligations. Inefficiencies occur in this scenario because companies are more vulnerable 
in volatile market conditions – interest obligations become more difficult to pay. 
Individuals and corporations may also choose not to realize a profit and reinvest in more 
prudent assets. A portfolio becomes highly inefficient if investors choose not to reallocate 
assets due to high tax rates – the portfolio essentially becomes riskier with the same 
expected return. 
Consumption: 
 Some believe (and this chapter confirms) that a tax on consumption comes the 
closest to ‘temporal neutrality’ than any other type of tax (excluding a lump-sum tax, of 
course). Temporal neutrality implies that a tax does not change spending preferences or 
the allocation of resources – after all, the goods that are being taxed are being consumed, 
not reallocated. When a tax on consumption increases, there is an initial reduction in 
consumption but increase in saving. Over time, capital stock builds up and consumption 
increases.   
 While the U.S. uses a standard sales tax, many countries implement a value added 
tax (VAT) in order to avoid the distortions created from a standard sales tax. For example, 
Argentina has a hefty 21% VAT in addition to labor and capital tax rates similar to the 
U.S.; they also have very elevated inflation, which raises a growing concern about their 
ability to pay off debt and maintain acceptable leve s of education and infrastructure – an 
issue not addressed in this chapter, but left for further discussion and investigation. A 
VAT from the standpoint of a buyer is the same as aconventional sales tax – a tax on the 
purchase price of a good. From the seller’s perspective, a VAT only applies to the value 
added of the good or service at any point in the manufacturing process. Since a sales tax 
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implemented by the seller requires the buyer to confirm being an end-consumer, there are 
minimal economic incentives for the seller to collect the tax if the buyer is not 
forthcoming. A VAT eliminates the requirement for a seller to confirm that a buyer is an 
end-consumer. 
The overhead and accounting costs are higher for a VAT and businesses realize 
higher net income under the less-administrative and costly sales tax. Additionally, under 
a sales tax scheme, only the end consumer is taxed and collected by the seller, whereas in 
a VAT system the wholesaler and manufacturers have to collect and administer the VAT. 
This could create a domino effect of increased prices that each step employs to cover the 
added overhead costs. In theory, a VAT and sales tax generate the same amount of 
revenue for a government, which is why this chapter and Chapter 2 compare Argentina 
and the U.S. even though the latter does not use a VAT.  
Inflation:  
 Inflation can be a significant source of revenue for governments particularly in 
developing countries that are trying to drive growth in capital accumulation. Tanzi (1978) 
reports that the Argentine inflation tax generates 1.2% of GDP when inflation is 10% 
(reported) or 3.3% when inflation is 30% (actual, according to consultancies). A 
discrepancy of 210 basis points is not insignificant d 3.3% of GDP is a substantial 
portion of government receipts considering total revenue is about 20% of GDP. Most 
often, governments finance capital development through their central banks via money 
creation. On a basic level, increased money supply raises price levels and diminishes the 
real value of a currency, thereby acting as a tax on cash balances. Bailey (1956) argues 
the ratio of the welfare cost to receipts is unfavor bly high even at low levels of inflation 
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and that there is a misallocation of resources when uncertainty about future prices is 
introduced. On the other hand, Aghevli (1971) finds that tax revenue from conventional 
sources (e.g. capital, labor, and consumption) is limited in developing countries and 
therefore the role of seigniorage becomes more important. 
According to Cooley and Hansen (1992), even though the consumption tax can 
cause distortions from the labor-leisure choice, an inflation tax will do the same in 
addition to distorting the ‘cash good-credit good’ decision. Similarly, an inflation tax 
(most notably in high inflation countries such as Argentina) can be costly from an 
administrative/ logistical standpoint (e.g. shoe leath r and menu costs). Tobin (1986) 
even explains the distortions from an inflation taxas “the diversion of resources or loss of 
utility associated with the scarcity of money.” Some argue, though, that unanticipated 
inflation is equal to a lump-sum tax and therefore p oduces a deadweight loss of zero 
(Makiw, 1987).  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
If the goal of tax policy is to collect a certain level of receipts, then why not do so 
in a manner that yields the highest utility for households? The results formulated in this 
chapter suggest that the current tax regime is suboptimal. Utility could be more favorable 
if the capital, labor, and inflation tax rates were replaced by a consumption tax. The 
above analysis uses the basic Ramsey growth model as well as simulation techniques in 
Matlab to examine how utility levels can be improved via re llocations of tax rates. This 
chapter finds that high capital tax rates, and subsequently large portions of tax receipts 
stemming from the capital tax base, correlate with lower utility. Furthermore, tax receipts 
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generated from consumption and labor derive more utility than from inflation and capital. 
If a government had full flexibility in enforcing atax code, then financing revenue 
requirements solely from consumption would be the most optimal followed by labor, 
inflation, and private capital.  
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D Steady-State “Dot” Equations 
Given the utility function, (5), in Chapter 3, subject to the budget constraint, (13), 
the Hamiltonian set up is given as   
P  678 'm»2:;
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?@
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First, the derivative of (D1) with respect to the control variable, c, set equal to 
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which set equal to the derivative of Equation (6) is Equation (15). 
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The above equation further simplifies to Equation (17): 
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The fourth step is to find the per-effective-worker law of motion for consumption, 
(M/(. To find this we need to consider the (Ss&Q&6 variable, ¬, and the s&Q&6 variable, . 
The negative derivative of (D1) with respect to  is equal to ¬M or BP/B:   
 ¬M  1°1         (D9) 
or 
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The subsequent dot equation is found by taking the tim  derivative of (D2): 
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Simplifying (D12) gives 
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which is the law of motion for consumption – Equation (16) when the dot variables are 





E Parameter Values 
Table 7. Parameter Descriptions and Values 
 
Symbol  Description  U.S.   AR   
!  Output Elasticity of Private Capital  1/3   0.25  
1 % !  Output Elasticity of Labor  2/3   0.75  
I  
β 
Constant-Consumption Elasticity of Labor Supply  
Real Money Elasticity of Utility 
0.5 
2   
1.5 
2   




Growth Rate of Real Balances 
Real Interest Rate 
Scalar in Labor Supply Function  
0.02 
0.02 
3   
0.02 
0.02 
3   
D  Rate of Time Preference  0.05   0.05  
C  Elasticity Factor (Isoelastic Curvature for Consumption)  0.5   0.5   
&   Private Capital Tax Rate  0.25   0.25  
&#  Labor Tax Rate  0.25   0.25  
&'  Consumption Tax Rate (Tax-Exclusive Rate)  0.05   0.21  
π Inflation (Official) 3% 9% 







Argentine Debt Spreads: An Analysis with Global 
Risk Aversion and Inflation 
 
External funding has become a major driver of state-led infrastructure investment 
and capital-intensive projects for developing countries, especially in Latin America. Such 
countries have therefore relied heavily on seigniorage and external bond financing from 
investors seeking long-term and fixed-rate investments to drive growth. Sovereign debt 
spreads have increased dramatically during the current European debt crisis, especially 
for emerging markets. Countries with unstable banking markets and unsustainable debt 
outlays have been more susceptible to decreased lending and financial instability. This is 
of crucial concern, as one of the main drivers of economic growth in emerging countries 
is external financing and, in particular, investment i  sovereign debt. As a result, 
empirical research, aiming to identify determinants of sovereign debt spreads among 
emerging economies, has grown substantially over the past decade. 
Given the similarities between the emerging economies of Latin America that 
went through a similar meltdown during the 1980s and the turn of the century, and those 
of Europe currently, it would be useful to see how debt yields persist before, during, and 
after fiscal instability periods. Latin American markets, like many Eastern European 
nations, are also notorious for risk of contagion when one country is experiencing 
financial difficulties. Once a framework to analyze government debt spreads is created, it 
will provide a way to interpret and draw lessons for the current European crisis. This 
chapter will use a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) framework and will consider 
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impulse response functions to show how shocks to fundamental and external factors 
affect Argentine debt fluctuations. More specifically, this chapter will add an inflation 
variable (both official and proprietary) to the framework introduced by Garcia and Ortiz 
(2006).  
 
4.1 Review of the Literature 
Identifying determinants of sovereign bond spreads ha become an especially 
salient issue given the current financial instability worldwide. Sovereign debt is 
government securities that are issued in foreign countries (and usually denominated in 
foreign currencies). These products trade on the over the counter (OTC) markets, which 
means the transactions do not pass through a clearinghouse. Debt spreads are defined as 
the difference between the interest (or coupon) rate of a foreign bond and the interest rate 
on the “risk-free” U.S. Treasury bond (e.g., 10-year). This spread is the premium 
investors receive from the added risk of a country's default. In fact, there are two sources 
of risk on foreign bonds. The first type is the country risk, which is the probability that 
the country will not be able or willing (e.g., Argentina) to pay back lenders/investors. The 
second type is exchange rate risk, which is the risk associated with the probability that 
the foreign currency will depreciate and pay a lower coupon than the investor expects. 
Both risks, play an important role in the pricing, return, and credit rating of sovereign 
debt products (Erb, Harvey and Viskanta, 2000; Kamin and Kleist, 1997; Eichengreen 
and Mody, 1998). 
Some argue that internal (or domestic) factors such as the fiscal deficit, 
government debt, inflation, changes in industrial production or other country 
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fundamentals are to blame for volatile debt spreads. Others argue that external (or global) 
factors like corporate bond spreads, global risk aversion, and risk-free interest rates 
determine debt spreads. Several studies show that internal variables such as fiscal deficits 
and public debt increase sovereign debt yields (Baldacci et al, 2010, Calvo et al, 1993). 
The strand of literature emphasizing external factors showed that factors such as risk 
appetite (proxied by high-yield corporate spreads), global liquidity proxied by U.S. 
Treasury bonds or the LIBOR (Gonzalez t al, 2008), and capital inflows (Ghosh et al, 
1992) are important factors in determining debt spreads.  
If the spread on a bond increases, investors might interpret this as an indication 
that there is now a higher probability of default, which could lead to a country not 
receiving much-needed funds. But in reality, perhaps the spike in interest rate is in 
response to central bank policy. Therefore, given the importance of external financing 
and the volatility of Latin American spreads, it is e sential these local government and 
economic authorities understand the main drivers of b nd spreads. A reasonable 
assumption is that both domestic and global factors play a role in determining spreads. 
While previous research incorporates both internal a d external factors in their analyses, 
they usually neglect one in order to make and argument for the other.  
Min et al (2003) use panel data for fixed-income securities of eleven countries in 
Latin America and Asia to quantify the effect liquidity, solvency, and macroeconomic 
fundamental variables have on debt spreads. Unlike most of the previous studies, Min et
al use an extensive list of determinants as explanatory variables. They find that the 
liquidity-related variables have very significant explanatory power, while external shocks 
such as oil prices do not. Moreover, Latin American ountries tend to exhibit an inverted 
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yield curve. They further confirm that country fundamentals such as those listed above 
influence sovereign spreads.  
Edwards (1985) uses variables, such as industrial poduction, inflation, and 
exchange rate, to characterize a country's fundamentals within a logistic framework to 
calculate the probability of default. The coefficients on the fundamental variables can be 
estimated using conventional methods (i.e., OLS). More generally, Edwards examines the 
pricing of international bonds and bank loans, the relationship of default risk premiums 
with debt and investment levels, and the foreshadowing effects that markets have with 
regard to debt crises. He finds that within both the international bond and bank loan 
markets, risk premiums are positively correlated with the debt-output ratio, while 
negatively correlated with the investment-GNP ratio. Additionally, with respect to the 
1980s Brazilian and Mexican debt crises, internation l markets only weakly anticipate 
crises a few weeks in advance.   
Garcia and Ortiz (2006), construct an SVAR model to examine debt spreads. 
They find that both external and internal factors have a statistically significant affect on 
debt spreads in eight countries within South America. They also attribute low risk 
aversion with low sovereign spreads. Their model is extended in this chapter below to 
incorporate inflation. Calvo et al (1993) find evidence that increases in U.S. short-term 
interest rates reduced capital inflows to their sample of ten Latin American countries. 
Accordingly, falling interest rates and a continuing recession encouraged investors to take 
advantage of renewed investment opportunities abroad. Ghosh et al (1992) show that 
externalities such as contagion affect capital inflows – reforms in some countries give 
78 
 
rise to expectations of future outcomes. They also find that a weakening economy can 
affect a neighboring country. 
While most of the literature seeks to identify determinants of sovereign spread 
fluctuation after bond issuance (or in the secondary markets), some argue that under this 
scenario the price decision of creditors are weighed more heavily in the pricing of bonds 
than the decisions of debtors, thus leading to selection bias. Eichengreen et al (1998) 
therefore consider determinants of spreads t i suance (or in the primary market) such as 
market sentiment, a dummy variable for whether a country restructured debt with private 
or official creditors during the previous year, and economic fundamentals. By examining 
‘launch’ or initial offer spreads, the problem of selection bias is alleviated because the 
decisions of both creditors and debtors are considered; new bonds are issued by emerging 
market borrowers and underwritten by a syndicate of investment banks that need to pitch 
them to investors. A price (or, inversely, a yield) needs to be appropriate for both the 
investor and borrower to ensure a successful offering. 
Using OLS and probit techniques for data on roughly one thousand developing 
country bonds issued from 1991 to 1996, Eichengreen et al find that bond issuance for a 
country is more likely when U.S. interest rates are low, when a country has better credit 
quality, and when foreign reserves are diminished. Better credit quality is measured by 
lower debt and budget deficits, while low foreign reserves are assumed to entice country 
governments to attract foreign funds via bond issuance. Additionally, market sentiment 
(or the way markets view a country’s ability to repay debt with given characteristics) 
contributes more heavily to launch spread fluctuation over several months than economic 
fundamentals even though the latter plays an important role over short periods. 
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Eichengreen et al therefore argue that while country fundamentals such as Debt/GNP, 
Debt service/exports, Reserves/GNP and credit ratings have period-to-period tractability 
to spreads, diversifying foreign funding via foreign direct investment, equity investment, 
and syndicated bank loans would prove beneficial given the erratic nature of market 
sentiment and bond financing. 
 Though Eichengreen et al offer insightful evidence for spread fluctuation, they do 
not include a measure for global risk aversion or cntagion effects, and they do not 
consider the breakdown of fundamental variables into transitory and permanent 
components as in Grandes (2007). Grandes finds that c nges in the permanent 
components describe the greatest variation in bond spreads when considering Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico. Furthermore, González-Rozada and Yeyati (2008) find that spread 
fluctuations are mostly determined by exogenous global factors such as international 
interest rates and corporate bond spreads. That is not to say that González-Rozada et al 
do not consider fundamentals. Instead, they conclude that after including differential 
effects that global characteristics have on specific ountries in a panel error correction 
model for data on thirty-one developing countries ranging from 1993 to 2001, the 
explanatory power of international interest rates and corporate bond spreads is almost 
80% as compared to 10% for fundamental dummies. In other words, the exogenous 
factors explain close to eighty percent of the long-run spread fluctuation when allowing 
global elasticities to vary between countries.  
 Arora and Cerisola (2001) also question Eichengreen’s proxy for global liquidity 
conditions – 10-year U.S. treasury bonds – since U.S. Treasuries are used in the 
calculation of sovereign debt spreads and as such cause further concern for endogeneity 
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issues. They therefore use the target Federal Funds rate to control for liquidity conditions 
and the ARCH volatility of three-month treasury bonds differenced with the Federal 
Funds target rate to control for financial fluctuations. Building from this literature, Alper 
(2006) uses the Federal Funds future rate as a proxy for global liquidity conditions. He 
then decomposes U.S. monetary policy into anticipated nd unanticipated components so 
as to estimate their relationship with global liquidity. Using unbalanced panel feasible 
GLS techniques (Kuttner, 2001), he finds that, unlike the anticipated component, the 
unanticipated component of monetary policy significantly explains spread movements.   
Not surprisingly, higher bond ratings are consistent with favorable country 
fundamentals such as low inflation, high growth and history that lacks defaults (Cantor 
and Packer, 1996; Juttner and McCarthy, 1998). As might be expected, higher bond 
ratings are also correlated to lower debt spreads. However, some argue that market 
fluctuations dictate ratings and not vice versa. González-Rozada et al look into how bond 
ratings affect spreads and find that they merely adapt to spread fluctuations (with a lag) 
and appear to be endogenous. Furthermore, Ferri et al (1999) argue that a lagged 
downgrade can exacerbate a country’s probability of default, while Mora (2004) asserts 
that ratings changes can actually stabilize a country i  a weakening economy.  
Using panel data estimation of ratings and spreads of 17 emerging market 
economies, Sy (2001) finds that ratings do not always djust to market fluctuations. In 
fact, ratings and spreads adjust differently based on whether the bond spreads are 
excessively high or excessively low. They find that when spreads are excessively high – as
determined by the 95% confidence interval – markets tighten about a month later rather 
than rating downgrades. Conversely, periods with excessively low spreads come about 
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three months before a credit upgrade rather than spread increases. Such insight could 
yield substantial investment opportunities. For example, fitted spread values might be 
predicted via similar economic fundamentals used by ratings agencies. Therefore, when 
these values differ substantially from actual market spreads, a savvy investor would act 
appropriately.  
When comparing the debt spreads of countries with dfferent exchange rate 
regimes (e.g., hard-peg, floating, etc.), a natural question is whether this affects the 
monetary autonomy of a country. Many economists are in agreement that domestic 
interest rates fluctuate differently with global interest rates based on an economy’s 
exchange rate regime. However some argue that interest rates of economies with a hard-
peg respond more significantly to global rates (Borensztein et al, 2001; Obstfeld et al, 
2004, 2005; Shambaugh, 2004). The countervailing view by others is that actually the 
more fixed the interest rate the less response domestic rates have to a fluctuation in global 
interest rates (Frankel, 1999; Hausmann et al, 1999).  
In either case, the control over domestic rates governments have while conducting 
monetary policy is therefore called into question. According to Calvo and Reinhardt 
(2002), larger governments have more monetary independence than do smaller 
economies. Moreover, economies cannot have monetary autonomy, open capital markets, 
and fixed exchange rates simultaneously; they can, however, follow two of these choices 
(Mundell, 1963). Duburcq (2010) follows by assessing whether a country’s exchange rate 
regime affects the predictability of domestic rates via internal and external variables. 
Using a VECM model of 8 Latin American countries she finds that with the exception of 
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Brazil, countries with rigidly-fixed exchange rates do not suffer largely from decreased 
monetary autonomy as compared to countries with floating exchange rate regimes.  
While SVAR and VECM methodology can provide useful insight into predictive 
effects of debt yields and overcomes some endogeneity problems, they only look at 
countries individually. Panel VAR captures time series dynamics and cross-country 
effects that lead to contagion, thereby avoiding this type of endogeneity. Further research 
could analyze the impulse response functions of shocks to the fundamental and financial 
variables to show the importance of each across several emerging countries to better draw 
parallels to the current European debt crisis.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
This section builds upon the methodology introduced in Garcia and Ortiz (2006) 
in which five equations comprise the SVAR model attempting to explain sovereign debt 
spreads. Where A and B are matrices, ÆÇ is the vector of innovations, and ÈÇ is a vector of 
shocks that are orthogonal: 
ÉÆÇ  ÊÈÇ. 
A is assumed to be diagonal and B is shown in the system of equations below, 






Garcia Model     
68l  (r8l          (1) 
68  (68l ) (Jr8          (2) 
68  (Ë68l ) (Ì68 ) (Ír8        (3) 
681  (Î68l ) (Ï68 ) (Ðr81        (4) 
68̂  (68 ) (681 ) (r8̂         (5) 
 
The variables are as follows: y is the level of real activity, i is the risk-free interest rate,  
is global risk aversion, d is the default parameter, and s is the sovereign debt spread. U.S. 
growth is exogenously determined in the first equation. Garcia et al mention that the 
results do not change if, instead, the U.S. interes ate, i, is exogenous. The second 
equation in the SVAR model indicates that U.S. monetary policy is determined by 
economic growth and the risk-free rate.24 As economic activity increases, the expected 
interest rate should also increase, leading the coeffi ient in this equation to be positive. 
Global risk aversion, as seen in the third equation, is dependent on U.S. growth 
and the risk-free rate. As U.S. economic activity and the risk-free rate increase, risk 
aversion should decrease, making the coefficients in Equation (3) negative. Garcia et al 
allow the possibility for U.S. economic growth and risk-free rate to affect Argentina’s 
fundamentals, or the default probability, as outlined in the fourth equation. The same 
assumption is made in this chapter, as it would seem plausible that Argentina’s economic 
well-being is not independent of macroeconomic conditions in U.S. For the same rational 
in Equation (3), the coefficients in Equation (4) should be negative – the probability of 
default decreases as economic activity in the U.S. and the risk-free rate increase. The 
                                                
24 U.S. inflation is excluded for simplicity. 
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final equation incorporates global risk aversion and the default parameter for explaining 
sovereign spreads. It is expected that as the probability of default and global risk aversion 
increase, the price of government bonds would decrease, leading to higher spreads. As 
such, the expected signs on the coefficients in Equation (5) are negative. U.S. activity and 
the risk-free rate affect Argentine sovereign spreads through their impact on the default 
variable and also on global risk aversion. Spreads are proxied by the JP Morgan EMBI+ 
index, which measures the total return performance of Argentina’s government bond 
market. 
 This chapter extends the Garcia et al SVAR framework by introducing Argentine 
inflation. In the benchmark system above, external forces, namely U.S. economic activity 
and the U.S. risk-free rate, affect the Argentine default parameter. This chapter allows for 
these external factors to also affect Argentine inflation. This relationship can be seen in 
the Equation (9) below. Additionally, implicit in the SVAR framework is inflation’s role 
as a determinant of Argentina’s probability of default, Equation (10), and also the price of 
owning Argentine debt obligations, Equation (11). 
Bauser Model 
68l  (r8l          (6) 
68  (68l ) (Jr8          (7) 
68  (Ë68l ) (Ì68 ) (Ír8        (8) 
68º  (Î68l ) (Ï68 ) (Ðr8º        (9) 
681  (68l ) (68 ) (68º ) (Jr81      (10) 
68̂  (Ë68 ) (Ì68º ) (Í681 ) (Îr8̂       (11) 
 
The variables are the same as those of the Garcia model in addition to Argentine inflation, 
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The Table 8 describes the variables and their sources. JP Morgan’s EMBI+ index is used 
to proxy the Argentine debt spread, s. The index tracks total returns for Argentine 
government bonds, which is the reason for using this index as opposed to using only one 
bond (or maturity). Global risk aversion (GRA), θ, measures the overall risk appetite of 
investors and is proxied by the Baa corporate bond spread. The Federal Reserve Bank 
publishes this on a monthly basis, which is the frequency used for each variable. The 
aggregate level of real activity data, y, are collected from the OECD and are used as a 
leading indicator for global risk aversion. The risk-free interest rate, i is the 10-year U.S. 
treasury rate, which was collected from the Federal Reserve Bank. The default parameter, 
d, is proxied by Bloomberg’s Argentine credit default swap index. The default parameter 







Table 8  
Variables and Data Sources 
      
Variable Description Data Source 
s AR Sovereign Debt Spread JP Morgan EMBI+ Index 
θ Baa Corporate Bond Spread (GRA) Federal Reserve Bank
y Aggregate Level of Real Activity OECD 
i 
d 
Risk-Free Interest Rate 
Default Parameter 
Federal Reserve Bank 
Bloomberg CDS Index 
π Inflation (Official) INDEC 
πun Inflation (Unofficial) Argentine Consultancy 
 
 
Official inflation rates (based on month over month growth) are collected from 
the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC), and the unofficial inflation data 
are collected from a macroeconomic consulting firm in Buenos Aires.25 The Consultancy 
collects prices from the four largest supermarkets’ websites on a weekly basis. As 
previously mentioned these data are quite different than the official pricing data that the 
governing authority INDEC posts. The Argentine government has retaliated by levying 
fines of 500,000 pesos to the major consultancies. As can be seen in the revealing figures 
below, not only are the official inflation estimates (both month over month and year over 
year) lower than The Consultancy’s estimates, but they are also considerably less volatile. 
The unofficial yearly data range from 15% to nearly 40%, while the official data are as 





                                                




Argentine Inflation (%, y/y) 
 
 
The month over month inflation data can be seen below in Figure 16 as well. 
Figure 16 
Argentine Inflation (%, m/m) 
 
 
The data run from November 2003 until May 2013, with the exception of the proprietary 
Argentine 



























































































































































































inflation data, which span the time period November 2007 through September 2012. The 
summary statistics can be seen in Table 9 below. 
Table 9 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ds 114 0.5567 7.1278 -33.3745 16.0452 
dy 114 0.0062 0.2820 -1.0138 0.6410 
di 114 -0.0208 0.2256 -1.1100 0.5300 
dtheta 114 -0.0169 0.2383 -0.7800 1.5700 
dd 103 28.60 393.14 -915.50 2855.00 
pi (m/m) 104 0.0074 0.0026 0.0000 0.0150 
piun (m/m) 59 0.0202 0.0101 0.0020 0.0540 
pi (y/y) 47 0.0894 0.0180 0.0530 0.1120 
piun (y/y) 47 0.2603 0.0630 0.1500 0.3880 
 
The variables ds and dy are changes in respective indeces, and di and inflation variables 
are changes in rates (in percent). The dd variable gives the change (in basis points) of 
Argentine credit default swaps. The monthly change i  Argentine credit default swaps, on 
average, is 0.28 percent. Notice the monthly change in d fault swaps has been as high as 
28.55 percent, as seen above, which was unsurprisingly in October 2008. 
 
4.4 Results 
All of the variables are I(1) except the inflation data, which are I(0), and the real 
activity data, which are I(3). Due to the sample size of each variable, several time periods 
are examined. The default data limit the benchmark (Garcia et al) and official regressions 
to October 2004 – May 2013. The proprietary inflation data (based on month to month 
 
growth in prices) run from November 2007 
financial shocks resulting from the mortgage crisis in 2008, regressions of the benchmark 
and newly proposed model are shown for 




There is little doubt within each regression that 
to a higher risk-free interest rate (
strong economy will see less monetary stimulus and therefore higher interest rates. 
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– September 2012. D
the time period October 2004 




increased economic activity 
as seen in the c2 row of Table 10). In other words, a 







impulse response function in Figure 17 (upper-right panel) shows this relationship. 
Similarly, the risk-free rate (c5) has a (significant) negative effect on global risk aversion. 









Argentina has been plagued with, what seems to havebecome cyclical, inflation 
over the years. Though hyperinflation, as in the early nineties, has not returned, 
consistent and debilitating price increases have been damaging to Argentina – a country 
with an unstable financial services industry and an u predictable government. 
Heightened prices have not been caused by one single variable, but instead a multitude of 
factors. For example, recently, cost-push inflation has ensued from a legislative halt of 
imported goods to the economy. The initial goal was to promote domestic production of 
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goods and services. While this goal might have occurred on a small scale, it has been at 
the cost of higher prices (normally kept down from foreign competition) and scarce 
resources (such as unique hospital supplies and even college textbooks) not immediately 
available domestically. Another influence on prices has been built-in inflation, which is 
not new to Argentina given its history with inflation. Simply put, expectations that prices 
will rise become a driver itself thereby increasing prices and becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  
To make matters worse, the official inflation data have become overly optimistic, 
perhaps as a way to reassure people the economy is not worsening. Unfortunately, the 
discrepancy between actual inflation levels and supposed levels has become too large to 
warrant any credibility to the official numbers. As such, normal responses to various 
dependent variables from inflation shocks are not always the case. This can be seen in the 
differing c7 coefficients, which shows the effect U.S. activity has on Argentine inflation. 
An active U.S. economy increases official inflation, but actually stabilizes (or reduces 
unofficial inflation, see Figure 18 below for the corresponding impulse response 
functions). It would not be unrealistic to assume th  Argentine economy is getting 
stronger when inflation decreases. Supporting this claim are the (significant) negative c10 
and c11 coefficients, which say that as U.S. economic activity and the risk free interest 
rate rise, the probability of an Argentine default decreases. Moreover, the c12 coefficient 
indicates that as Argentine inflation increases so does the probability of default. In fact, 
for every percentage point increase in inflation (m/m), Argentine credit default swap 
spreads rise 1.71 percent (or 171 basis points). Official data are not significant during this 
time period – likely due to spreads correctly adjusting to the volatile markets and official 
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data not. Official data show a lower effect (roughly alf) during the pre-crisis period and 







While inflation has significant explanatory power for the default parameter, it does not 
directly have any significance with respect to sovereign spreads (c15). The government 
pricing data actually finds that inflation negatively correlates with their bond rates. This 
would imply that Argentine debt becomes more attractive as inflation increases – a very 
convenient conclusion given the rampant price instabili y and lack of demand for 
government debt. The Consultancy data disprove this theory.  
 
Global Risk Aversion 
The general lack of significance of y’s effect on global risk aversion (c4) in 
Garcia et al is also apparent in the results of this chapter. However, during the pre crisis 
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period, increased economic activity tended to increase risk aversion, which is not what 
would be expected. The upper left panel in Figure 19, in fact, shows the effect is initially 
negative and then grows positive. 
 
Figure 19 




Global risk aversion should also cause investors to eek less risky investments 
than Argentine bonds and as such bond prices should c me down (with spreads shifting 
upwards). GRA and spreads should therefore be positively correlated, however, during 
the crisis period it is negative. Perhaps global investors were seeking fixed income 
products outside the US, which would bring the price of Argentine bonds up (and spreads 
down). The pre crisis the coefficient (c14) is positive, but is negative for the 2007-2012 
time period. Interestingly, the impulse functions idicate that the negative effects become 
positive after roughly five periods. Therefore befor  and after the crisis global risk 
aversion exhibits positive effects on Argentine spreads. Figure 20 shows the response of 
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Argentine spreads to shocks in the other variables. 
 
Figure 20 




Probability of Default 
The default parameter explaining sovereign spreads (coefficient c16) is 
significantly positive in every regression. As the spread on Argentine credit default 
spreads rise, so do the interest rates on less attractive government bonds. As mentioned 
above, higher inflation is associated with higher CDS spreads, which are associated with 
higher bond spreads. Curiously, during the pre crisis period, an increase in the risk-free 
interest rate led to heightened default probability for Argentina (c11 coefficient). 
However (as in Garcia et al), using the 2007-2012 data, the relationship becoms 
negative. The latter explanation would seem reasonable given that in a strong U.S. 
economy (with a higher risk-free rate), the probability of default becomes reduced. This 








Future research might investigate the explanatory pwer of global risk aversion 
on the default probability, as there seems to be a large positive effect in the impulse 
response function above. Reasonably, as investors become more risk averse, the 
probability of default increases. Each of the impulse response functions above can be 
seen below next to its corresponding figure with the official inflation rate during the same 
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 The orthogonalized response functions are largely insignificant, and as such the 
contemporaneous effects outlined in Table 10 are the basis for the results in this chapter. 
The results do not change when considering the cumulative impulse response functions, 
with the exception of three cases – all of which have to do with economic activity 
influencing other variables. The significant cumulative results can be seen below in 
Figure 28 (considering the unofficial inflation data). When economic activity increases, 
global risk aversion decreases (people become less risk averse) and the probability of 
default in Argentina is reduced.  There is a positive correlation between economic 
activity and sovereign spreads, which means as the U.S. economy picks up, Argentine 


















 The results only change slightly when considering a Cholesky setup – when 
global risk aversion is inserted into Equations (9) and (10), and economic activity and the 
risk free interest rate are inserted into Equation (11). Under this framework, global risk 
aversion no longer becomes a significant predictor of sovereign spreads, but does 
significantly correlate with the probability of default and inflation in Argentina. As global 
investors become more risk averse, Argentine inflation increases, while the probability of 
default decreases. These results are somewhat inconclusive, as global risk aversion is 
widely believed to be a significant predictor of sovereign spreads and as such, the non-
Cholesky setup introduced in the chapter above yields more realistic results. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Based on the SVAR results and impulse response functions above, global risk 
aversion and the probability of default have significant impacts on Argentine debt 
spreads. The results indicate that as investors becom  more risk averse, they buy less 
Argentine bonds. Spreads jump up positively after investors become more risk averse and 
therefore move out of Argentine bonds and into lower-risk assets. That said, Argentine 
bonds were more attractive after the U.S. mortgage crisis, which can be seen by the 
negative GRA coefficient (c14) in explaining spreads. The probability of default as 
measured by the spread on Argentine credit default swaps has a positive impact on debt 
spreads. Inflation does not have much direct predictive power in explaining Argentine 
sovereign spreads (not even the proprietary data), but has a significant indirect effect 
through the default variable (coefficient c12 in the regression results). Additionally, the 
risk-free interest rate has a significant negative eff ct on global risk aversion, Argentine 
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inflation, and the probability of default. In summary, the proprietary data produce results 
unique from, and in many cases more economically viable than, the official inflation data, 







 The growth effects from tax cuts in both the United States and Argentina are 
largest when coming from private capital. Moreover, collecting receipts from 
consumption, as opposed to labor, capital, or inflation, creates the highest level of utility. 
Though the marginal increase in utility from reallocating taxes into consumption is lower 
in Argentina than the U.S., it is still economically significant in both countries and 
feasible from a FairTax standpoint. Incorporating inflation into a dynamic scoring 
framework shows that a capital and labor tax cut in Argentina finances more of the static 
loss in the steady state than in the US. Inflation also has more predictive power with 
regards to Argentina default spreads when using unofficial pricing data as opposed to 
official data. As investors become more risk averse, Argentine bond prices decrease and 
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